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Production and hosting byIn this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is inﬂuenced by ownership type.
Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding
agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conﬂicts (reduce free
cash ﬂow) or may be used to extract cash from ﬁrms (tunneling eﬀect) – which
could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect ﬁrms with foreign own-
ership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have diﬀerent dividend
policies and practices than those that are not, and ﬁrms with more state own-
ership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends
and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using ﬁrms from an emerging economy
(China), we examine whether these eﬀects exist in corporate dividend policy
and practice. We ﬁnd that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have signif-
icant negative eﬀects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling eﬀect and
the notion of reduced tunneling activities for ﬁrms with the ability to raise cap-
ital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling eﬀect, we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower
stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public (individual) ownership.
Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the eﬀect of state
ownership on dividend policy. Our results have signiﬁcant implications for
researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.
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200 K.C.K. Lam et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 199–2161. IntroductionCorporate dividend policy has attracted the interest of researchers of capital markets and corporate behav-
ior for almost half a century. Today, corporate governance and ownership structure issues continue to be of
major interest to researchers, practitioners and policy makers, in particular following accounting scandals
such as Enron and WorldCom in 2002 and the corresponding legislative reforms such as the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act in the United States. Empirical research on corporate governance is based on the theoretical framework of
agency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), which provides a framework to
explain how to create an eﬀective monitoring and incentive scheme under uncertainty and incomplete infor-
mation. Following this line of research, the literature has argued that dividends can be used to prevent insiders
from diverting retained earnings for their own beneﬁt. In countries with strong investor protection, dividends
are found to play a useful role in reducing agency problems, whereas they play a less important role in coun-
tries with weak investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000). China is a civil law country with weak investor pro-
tection and according to the La Porta et al. (2000) model, lower dividend payout ratios are expected. However,
along with dynamic changes, extremely high payout ratios have been observed in China (Chen et al., 2009). In
this paper, we shed light on such a dilemma by focusing on whether corporate ownership structure has an
inﬂuence on corporate dividend policies.
Corporate ownership structure could be associated with dividend policy and practice in that dividends sig-
nal the extent of conﬂicts between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (e.g. Jensen et al., 1992).
While empirical studies have documented the signiﬁcant role of ownership variables in determining dividend
policies (Thomsen, 2005; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006; Khan, 2006; Szilagyi and Renneboog, 2007), the results
are quite mixed. For instance, Szilagyi and Renneboog (2007) ﬁnd a positive relationship between stakehold-
ers’ ownership and dividends for Dutch ﬁrms, while Thomsen (2005) and Khan (2006) ﬁnd a negative relation-
ship for UK ﬁrms.
In addition, the potential impact of foreign stockholder ownership has been largely neglected, especially in
emerging markets where the ownership structures and institutional background are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those of developed economies. In a recent study, Ferguson et al. (2002) show that the disclosure policies and
disclosure behavior of Chinese ﬁrms issuing cross-listed shares on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (H-
shares on SEHK) were very diﬀerent from other SEHK-listed ﬁrms and state-owned ﬁrms incorporated in
Hong Kong (Red-chip shares), which they attribute to signaling incentives and cost-beneﬁt concerns. Such
diﬀerences might also exist for dividend policies and practices. If dividends play a signaling role, then the fact
that ﬁrms are listed overseas may have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on their dividend policies and practices com-
pared to those that are not. Therefore, in an emerging market setting, we investigate whether there are signif-
icant diﬀerences in dividend policies and practices between ﬁrms with cross-listed shares and/or foreign
ownership and those without.
Other motivations of our study come from the unique institutional setting of public ﬁrms in China. The
literature has documented several possible motivations for public ﬁrms to pay dividends, such as to signal
ﬁrms’ future prospects to investors (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985), restrain agency prob-
lems by forcing ﬁrms to external capital markets with additional monitoring (Rozeﬀ, 1982; Easterbrook,
1984), reduce management’s opportunity to invest the ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow in projects that beneﬁt manage-
ment at shareholders’ expense (Jensen, 1986) or projects that beneﬁt controlling shareholders at minority
shareholders’ expense (Faccio et al., 2001) and to minimize taxes (Wilkinson et al., 2001).
However, in contrast to the earlier hypothesis that dividend payments are a vehicle to constrain the agency
behavior of managers (e.g., Jensen, 1986), cash dividends are preferred by majority shareholders in emerging
markets (Chen et al., 2009). This may occur because the ﬁrms listed in emerging markets are mostly equity
carve-outs, a term used to indicate that these ﬁrms were originally part of assets or subsidiaries of state-owned
enterprises and were chosen to be listed because they were relatively attractive to investors. Earlier literature
has documented that Chinese ﬁrms with a controlling state shareholder are more likely to pay cash dividends
and state shareholders are more likely to surrender the exercise of stock subscription rights (Wei et al., 2004).11 Rights oﬀerings are the oﬀering to existing shareholders of rights to subscribe to common stocks.
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price higher than a price under private placement (Lee and Xiao, 2004).2
In contrast, stock dividends can play a diﬀerent role from cash dividends in the emerging market of China.
First, ﬁrms with better prospects are more capable of signaling through stock dividend distribution, which is
the only available signaling alternative as stock splits are not allowed in China. Second, stock dividend distri-
butions restrict a ﬁrm’s ability to pay cash dividends in the future, indicating that stock dividends are less
likely to be used by state shareholders as such dividends limit their ability to obtain cash from listed companies
in the future. Furthermore, stock dividend distribution can increase the share’s liquidity and its attractiveness
to investors (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987).
In summary, cash dividends and stock dividends play diﬀerent roles in China. Cash dividends, coupled with
non-subscription of shares in subsequent rights oﬀers, represent the return of cash to controlling shareholders
and such behavior is termed ‘tunneling’ in the recent literature. Stock dividends, without entailing actual cash
outﬂow, cannot play such a tunneling role but can be used as a credible mechanism to convey insider infor-
mation to investors. China provides a unique setting for researchers to study the diﬀerence between cash div-
idends and stock dividends and their determinants.
Both the policies and practices related to cash dividends and stock dividends are examined in our paper to
obtain a suﬃcient understanding of their roles and relationships with corporate ownership structure in the
emerging market of China. In addition, along with the roles of cross-listings and foreign ownership in inﬂu-
encing dividend policy, which have not been examined and are one of the aims of our paper, we also inves-
tigate the eﬀects of state-ownership and individual ownership on dividends to obtain a comprehensive
understanding of the diﬀerent roles of various shareholders in the same setting. Finally, we control for other
factors that are considered as determinants of dividends in the literature. These factors include ﬁrm size, lever-
age, risk, growth opportunity, free cash ﬂow and proﬁtability (Alpa, 2005; Goergen et al., 2005).
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher foreign ownership and cross-listed ﬁrms are less likely to distribute cash div-
idends, which are consistent with the notion of reduced tunneling activities for ﬁrms with the ability to raise
capital outside of China. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends
and lower stock dividends, indicating that the tunneling eﬀect dominates the signaling eﬀect for ﬁrms with
higher state ownership. Furthermore, ﬁrms with higher individual ownership tend to pay higher stock divi-
dends and lower cash dividends, where the signaling eﬀect dominates.
Our paper adds to the literature by exploring the role of cross-listing and foreign ownership in determining
dividend policy. In particular, we extend the current literature by examining whether companies issuing B-
shares, H-shares (in Hong Kong) or cross listed in the US or other markets follow a diﬀerent policy than doc-
umented in early studies on ﬁrms issuing only domestic shares (e.g., Wei et al., 2004).
In addition, our study provides updated research on the relationship between corporate ownership struc-
ture and dividends. In light of the changes in regulation and ownership, we ﬁnd a trend toward less cash div-
idends and more stock dividends during our sample period, which is in contrast to the trend toward more cash
dividends and less stock dividends found by earlier studies, such as Wei et al. (2004) with a sample period from
1995 to 2000.
Finally, our paper contributes to the understanding of whether and how majority shareholders use dividend
policies to facilitate tunneling cash to themselves. For instance, the role of state shareholders in the unique
setting of the emerging market of China can help us obtain a better understanding of the role of government
ownership in business.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulatory requirements of dividend policy in
China, including the types of dividends and the institutional setting relevant to dividend policies. The litera-
ture review and hypothesis development are included in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the sample, variables
and empirical method used in examining the association between dividend policy and corporate ownership2 State shares were typically non-tradable during the period of our study. They could only be bought and sold through private placement
with special approval from the government. However, as discussed later in the paper, in 2005, the Chinese government launched a reform
on split share structure by converting non-tradable shares (state and legal person shares) into tradable shares. Nonetheless, it has been
argued that the change has only been superﬁcial and the shares, even after the conversion, are “de facto non-tradable shares” (Cheng et al.,
2009). Moreover, the dates that these shares can be converted occur after 2006, which is outside the period of our study. Note 8 below also
reports the results from sensitivity tests to examine the conversion eﬀect on our analysis.
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and implications.2. Regulatory requirements of dividend policy in China
2.1. Dividend policy in China
Three general forms of dividend policies are used in public ﬁrms in China: cash dividends, stock dividends
and a combination of the two (Milonas et al., 2006). There is no mandatory dividend rule that requires a cer-
tain percentage of net income or retained earnings to be paid out as dividends and listed companies are
allowed to make their own dividend policies (Wei et al., 2004). However, when the board of directors of a ﬁrm
proposes a distribution of dividends, the proposed dividend policy is subject to ﬁnal approval at the sharehold-
ers’ meeting (Milonas et al., 2006). Moreover, the details are required to be announced in designated newspa-
pers along with the interim or annual report. In particular, listed ﬁrms should explicitly show the source of
dividends in their annual report (Wei et al., 2004).3
The dividend policies of listed companies have experienced signiﬁcant changes since the establishment of
stock markets in China. In the early stage of the stock markets, ﬁrms tended to distribute stock dividends
rather than cash dividends. For instance, in 1992, about 96.23% of ﬁrms distributing dividends paid stock div-
idends, while in 2000 only 11.25% paid stock dividends (Wei et al., 2004). The same study reported that on
average, 53.5% of ﬁrms distributed cash dividends from 1992 to 2001. Table 1 provides information using
more recent data. The percentage of ﬁrms paying only cash dividends fell from 51.91% in 2001 to 38.02%
in 2006, while ﬁrms paying only stock dividends ranged from 4.91% in 2001 to 9.76% in 2006 with ﬂuctuations
in between. Firms distributing both cash and stock dividends ranged from 7.72% to 13.94% during the same
period. Non-dividend payers rose from 31% in 2001 to 40.67% in 2006. Thus, our results show an inverse trend
when compared to the 1995–2000 results of Wei et al. (2004). Fewer ﬁrms paid cash dividends over the period
of 2001–2006 than the previous period, which warrants investigation to shed light on this shift in dividend
policies.2.2. Institutional factors that aﬀect dividend policy
There are a few institutional features that aﬀect dividend policies. First, state shareholders seem to play a
dominant role in determining dividend policies. Most of the listed companies in China are state-owned and the
government has enormous discretion on dividend policy (Wei et al., 2004). Although the number of privately-
owned listed companies has increased over time, most listed companies are still controlled by state sharehold-
ers. Table 2 illustrates the ownership situation of listed ﬁrms in China from 2001 to 2006. For non-tradable
shares, state ownership declined from 40.8% in 2001 to 28.8% in 2006. Management ownership (inside
employee ownership) decreased from 0.71% in 2001 to 0.1% in 2006. Institutional ownership changed from
18.29% in 2001 to 19% in 2006.4 For tradable shares, public ownership increased from 35.95% in 2001 to
45.88% in 2006. Foreign ownership (combination of B-shares and H-shares) decreased slightly from 3.06%
in 2001 to 2.71% in 2006.
Second, the role of minority shareholders in corporate governance is limited in China (Jiang et al., 2010).
The Chinese legal system oﬀers few options for minority shareholders to take private enforcement against mis-
conduct by large shareholders. The authority of regulators to enforce punitive action is also restricted. In addi-
tion, as institutional investors, such as mutual funds, are at a primitive stage in this emerging market, it is
more diﬃcult for a fund to inﬂuence corporate governance compared to its counterparts in the United States.3 The source of stock dividends can be from capital reserves, surplus reserves and/or undistributed proﬁts. Capital surplus refers to
capital accumulation due to the increase of net assets resulting from non-operating activities, such as premium on paid in capital, receipt of
donations, government appropriations and foreign currency translation diﬀerence. Surplus reserve refers to the reserves setup from proﬁts
annually in accordance with government regulations. Article 177 of the Chinese Company Law requires an amount of 10% of after-tax
proﬁts to be provided annually to the surplus reserve.
4 As also suggested in Note 2 above, the ﬁgures should be interpreted within the context of the 2005 share structure reform launched by
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, 2005).
Table 1
Number and percentage of China listed ﬁrms with cash and/or stock dividends. This table reports the number and percentage of ﬁrms
paying no dividends and those of ﬁrms paying cash (stock) dividends from 2001 to 2006. In China some ﬁrms pay stock dividends and cash
dividends at the same time, some pay only stock dividends or only cash dividends, and others pay no dividends.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Firms paying only cash dividends
Number of ﬁrms 571 519 513 554 507 530
Percentage of all listed ﬁrms (%) 51.91 45.41 42.12 41.75 37.78 38.02
Firms paying only stock dividends
Number of ﬁrms 54 55 55 55 50 136
Percentage of all listed ﬁrms (%) 4.91 4.81 4.52 4.14 3.73 9.76
Firms paying both stock and cash dividends
Number of ﬁrms 134 95 94 185 134 161
Percentage of all listed ﬁrms (%) 12.18 8.31 7.72 13.94 9.99 11.55
Non-dividend payers
Number of ﬁrms paying neither cash nor stock dividends 341 474 556 533 651 567
Percentage of all listed ﬁrms (%) 31.00 41.47 45.65 40.17 48.51 40.67
All listed ﬁrms 1100 1143 1218 1327 1342 1394
Table 2
Average ownership structure of listed companies from 2001 to 2006 (%). This table reports descriptive statistics of the ownership structure
of listed ﬁrms in China. Source: TEJ database.
2001 (%) 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%)
Non-tradable shares
State-owned shares 40.81 40.46 38.50 35.90 34.18 28.75
Inside employee shares 0.71 0.44 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.10
Domestic institutional shares 11.36 11.34 12.71 14.48 14.83 16.03
Placement institutional shares 6.93 6.83 6.88 6.64 6.06 2.96
Other shares 0.13 0.37 0.82 1.92 1.74 2.18
Foreign institutional shares 1.05 1.01 1.18 1.30 1.40 1.39
Subtotal 60.99 60.45 60.29 60.42 58.33 51.41
Tradable shares
Public individual shares 35.95 36.49 36.79 36.85 38.88 45.88
Foreign within China shares (B-shares) 2.39 2.30 2.15 2.01 2.05 1.92
Foreign outside China shares (H-shares) 0.67 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.74 0.79
Subtotal 39.01 39.55 39.71 39.58 41.67 48.59
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Of the above
Total foreign shares 4.11 4.07 4.10% 4.03 4.19 4.10
Total institutional shares 18.29 18.17 19.59 21.12 20.89 18.99
Average ownership by top 10 shareholders 61.50 61.95 61.31% 61.91 60.60 56.36
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2010). Hence, it is more diﬃcult for a fund to inﬂuence corporate governance compared to its counterparts in
the US.
Finally, controlling shareholders of public ﬁrms seem to prefer cash dividends to stock dividends in China,
where most ﬁrms are carved out from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As the government restrictively regu-
lates both IPOs and seasoned equity ﬁnancing, many ﬁrms and their holding companies are short of working
capital. Moreover, state shares are not tradable in the market (Sami and Zhou, 2004). In such a setting, con-
trolling shareholders, particularly in SOEs, may force listed ﬁrms to pay cash dividends to fulﬁll their capital
needs (Lee and Xiao, 2004).
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meet the following requirements5 in order to distribute stock dividends: (1) they must have recovered any prior
losses (if any), (2) the amount can be distributed only if there is a suﬃcient balance for the appropriation of the
statutory surplus reserve, including that related to the public welfare fund, (3) the statutory surplus reserve
and capital reserve, after the distribution, must not be less than 50% of the capital stock account balance,
and (4) the stock dividend must be oﬀered to all registered common stockholders. As a result, stock dividend
distribution is not only limited to proﬁtable companies it is also limited in its scale.
The accounting treatment for stock dividends also aﬀects the popularity of stock dividends. Stock dividends
are accounted for in China by reclassifying the appropriate undistributed and reserve accounts to the capital
stock account based on the par value of the stock dividends issued (Lan, 2001, pages 11–13). This is diﬀerent
from the prevailing practices in other countries (such as the US) where the transfer is based on the fair value of
the stock dividends issued (Kieso et al., 2007, pages 745–746). The fact that the par value is usually lower than
its fair value explains why stock dividends are more prevalent in China than in the US.3. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1. Determinants of dividend payout policy
The literature on dividend policy provides three schools of theoretical models to explain corporate dividend
behavior. The ﬁrst group of theories (full information models) argues that investors demand higher expected
returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks as a result of the imposition of a tax liability on dividends (Miller
and Scholes, 1978; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). The second group of theories (information asymmetry mod-
els) is based on the market ineﬃciency hypothesis related to asymmetric information (Kale and Noe, 1990;
John and Kalay, 1982; Jensen, 1986). The third group of theories (behavioral models) suggests that investor
behavior is substantially inﬂuenced by societal norms and attitudes (Shiller, 1984) and dividend payouts can
be viewed as the socioeconomic eﬀect of corporate evolution (Frankfurter and Lane, 1992).
First, the literature has documented that tax factors aﬀect the demand from investors to increase sharehold-
ers’ pre-tax returns (Miller and Scholes, 1978; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). This suggests a negative relation-
ship between tax rates and dividend payouts. However, a survey on the management of US companies
indicates that diﬀerential taxes were a consideration, but not a ﬁrst-order concern in payout policy decisions
(Brav et al., 2005). Their results suggest that the factors discussed below could be more important in a low
dividend tax environment.
Second, the literature also provides models based on the market ineﬃciency hypothesis related to asymmet-
ric information, such as dividend signaling models (Kale and Noe, 1990). This is consistent with agency the-
ory, which uses dividend policy to align the interests of shareholders and corporate managers (John and
Kalay, 1982). Many researchers believe that dividends can convey information about a ﬁrm’s prospects.
One possibility is that dividends could simply convey information not previously known to the market (Miller
and Rock, 1985), even if managers are not explicitly signaling private information. Alternatively, dividends
can be used explicitly as an expensive signal to alter market perceptions of future earnings prospects (e.g.,
Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985). This line of literature has consistent ﬁndings that ﬁrms’ hes-
itancy to cut dividends is related to signaling. The reason is that the market perceives that only ﬁrms with long-
run and severe liquidity crises make dividends cut, and ﬁrms normally do not want to give the market such an
impression. It would be extremely costly for bad ﬁrms to mimic good ﬁrms’ policy of not cutting dividends.
Therefore, by not cutting its dividend, a good ﬁrm might be able to separate itself from bad competitors (Brav
et al., 2005).
Third, the dividend literature has also developed clientele theory, which suggests that investor behavior is
substantially inﬂuenced by societal norms and attitudes (Shiller, 1984) and dividend payouts can be viewed as
the socioeconomic eﬀect of corporate evolution. That is, the segregation of management and ownership makes5 The requirements are based on the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading (see GTA 2010, page
11). Further to Note 3 above, the public welfare fund is part of the surplus reserve which is designed to be used for expenditure relating to
employees’ welfare (Chong and Wang, 2004).
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advantage of dividends, paying dividends is an important factor in attracting individual investors to own
shares (Brav et al., 2005). From management’s perspective, institutions attempt to inﬂuence dividend decisions
as much as they try to inﬂuence repurchase decisions. However, there are mixed results as to whether dividend
payments are a signiﬁcant factor aﬀecting institutions’ decisions (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; Brav et al., 2005).
Corporate ownership structure could be associated with dividend policy and practice in that dividends sig-
nal the extent of conﬂicts between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Jensen et al., 1992). While
empirical studies have investigated the signiﬁcant role of diﬀerent ownership variables in determining dividend
policies (Thomsen, 2005; Khan, 2006; Szilagyi and Renneboog, 2007, among others), the results are quite
mixed. For instance, Szilagyi and Renneboog (2007) ﬁnd a positive relationship between stakeholders’ own-
ership and dividends for Dutch ﬁrms, while Thomsen (2005) and Khan (2006) ﬁnd a negative relationship for
UK ﬁrms. We attempt to shed more light on such issues using data from the emerging market of China.
3.2. Studies on dividend payout in china and hypothesis development
The dividend literature usually suggests that paying cash dividends mitigates the conﬂict of interest between
majority shareholders and minority shareholders (e.g., Faccio et al., 2001). However, recent studies in China
provide the opposite evidence. For instance, Wei et al. (2004) analyze the eﬀects of state and individual share-
holders on dividend policy, and ﬁnd a positive relationship between state ownership and cash dividends and
between individual ownership and stock dividends. Moreover, the higher the state ownership, the higher the
cash dividend rate. Similarly, Lee and Xiao (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher state ownership in China are
more likely to pay cash dividends, increase cash dividends subsequent to rights oﬀerings and give up stock
subscription rights. As state shares in China can only be transferred with special approval by the government,
this dividend practice has the same eﬀect as the state’s transfer of a portion of non-tradable shares to other
shareholders. In addition, Lee and Xiao (2004) ﬁnd that the computed transfer price is about three times
higher than that of a typical private placement oﬃcially approved by the government. The capital market
reacts negatively to the cash dividend announcements of state controlling ﬁrms but positively to those of other
ﬁrms, suggesting that instead of alleviating agency problems, cash dividends might be used as a vehicle for
tunneling in ﬁrms with the state as the controlling shareholder.
There are several reasons proposed in the literature suggesting stock dividends can play a diﬀerent role than
cash dividends in China. First, as argued by the traditional signaling theory, managers of public ﬁrms can use
stock dividends to signal favorable insider information to the market (Grinblatt et al., 1984). Firms with better
prospects are more capable of signaling because the reduction in the balance of retained earnings resulting
from stock dividend distributions will constrain their future cash dividend payments. However, ﬁrms with
poorer prospects ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to mimic this behavior as their undistributed proﬁts cannot be replen-
ished so easily. Although stock splits are as credible a signal as stock dividends, they are prohibited in China
(Wei and Xiao, 2009). Thus, stock dividends are the only available signaling alternative. Second, stock divi-
dend distribution restricts a ﬁrm’s ability to pay cash dividends in the future, indicating that stock dividends
are less likely to be used to tunnel cash to majority shareholders in the future. Third, as the demand for equity
shares in China is strong due to the lack of other investment opportunities (Chen and Yuan, 2004), stock div-
idend distribution can increase the share’s liquidity and its attractiveness to investors (Lakonishok and Lev,
1987). Fourth, Chinese companies could raise more capital by paying stock dividends than paying cash div-
idends before a rights issue (Wei and Xiao, 2009). Under the rules of the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission, the price used for rights issues should be based on the average share price during the period of twenty
days prior to the disclosure of the prospectus. As stock dividend declaration often increases stock prices while
cash dividends often decrease stock prices, stock dividends can increase the money raised in a subsequent
rights issue.
In sum, cash dividends and stock dividends play diﬀerent roles in China. Cash dividends, coupled with non-
subscription of shares in subsequent rights oﬀerings, represent the return of cash to controlling shareholders
and such behavior is termed “tunneling” in the recent literature. Stock dividends, without entailing actual cash
outﬂow, cannot play such a tunneling role but can be used as a credible mechanism to convey insider infor-
mation to investors.
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earnings surprise is corroborated by a stock dividend surprise of the same directional sign, the earnings signal
is stronger. Chen et al. (2002) also ﬁnd that changes in cash dividends have little incremental information
value. Cheng et al. (2006) conduct event studies on Chinese ﬁrms’ announcements of stock dividends and cash
dividends. Their results indicate that cash dividends are preferred by non-tradable shareholders while stock
dividends are preferred by individual investors. They also ﬁnd that stock dividends are positively related to
earnings and return on assets, supporting the signaling hypothesis of dividend policy. In a more recent paper,
Cheng et al. (2007) examine dividend policies of underperforming ﬁrms in China and Hong Kong. They ﬁnd
that poor performing Chinese ﬁrms with higher non-tradable shares pay out more cash dividends than those
with a lower proportion of non-tradable shares.
Hence, the literature generally supports the two distinct roles played by cash and stock dividends in China.
However, none of these studies have investigated whether ﬁrms with cross-listed shares and/or foreign own-
ership use diﬀerent dividend policies than other ﬁrms or how foreign ownership and cross-listing act as mod-
erating factors for diﬀerent types of dividends.
As indicated in the dividend literature, dividends play a signaling role. The fact that ﬁrms are listed overseas
could make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in these ﬁrms’ dividend policies and practices compared to those that are
not. For instance, cross-listing in the U.S. allows “good” ﬁrms to separate themselves from “bad” ﬁrms
because disclosure requirements and legal liability makes cross-listing much more costly for “bad” ﬁrms
(Fuerst, 1998). In addition, given that foreign investors are at an informational disadvantage in obtaining
information about a local ﬁrm’s future prospects compared with domestic investors (Choe et al., 2005), an
increase in foreign ownership may lead to increased demand and pressure for increased disclosure by local
ﬁrms. For instance, Sami and Zhou (2004) ﬁnd that the value relevance of accounting information in the
B-share market of China (where foreigners invest) is generally higher than in the A-share market (where
domestic investors trade). A-shares’ accounting information is prepared and audited for domestic investors
under the domestic accounting standards, while B-shares’ information is prepared and audited for foreign
investors under international accounting standards. Their results suggest that the presence of foreign owner-
ship may help to improve the general information environment of public companies. Similarly, an increase in
foreign ownership may lead to increased demand and pressure for improved corporate governance. Not sur-
prisingly, foreign investors are shown to contribute to ﬁrm performance through shareholder activism and
board representation (Choi et al., 2007). Thus we would expect that the presence of foreign investors would
deter the tunneling behavior of state shareholders and that foreign ownership would be negatively associated
with cash dividends and positively associated with stock dividends. This is consistent with the signaling
hypothesis of dividends in that the managers of public ﬁrms with foreign investors and cross-listings would
have diﬀerent dividends policies than those without. Finally, foreign investors tend to prefer ﬁrms with more
investment opportunities. Hence, they might be more likely to prefer stock dividends to cash dividends (Lin
and Schiu, 2003).
Based upon the discussions above, we develop the following hypotheses for our study:Hypothesis on cross-
listing and dividends:
Hypothesis 1. Firms with cross-listed shares are more likely to pay stock dividends and less likely to pay cash
dividends.
Hypothesis on foreign ownership and dividends:
Hypothesis 2. Firms with foreign ownership are more likely to pay stock dividends and less likely to pay cash
dividends.
In addition, the literature above indicates that cash dividends could be used by majority shareholders as a
tunneling tool, which could be predominant in emerging markets (e.g., Lee and Xiao, 2004; Cheng et al.,
2006). If ﬁrms have controlling state shareholders, they are more likely to pay cash dividends and increase cash
dividend payments soon after rights oﬀerings to transfer more cash to state controlling shareholders. Cash div-
idends are paid to a government agent, the State-owned Asset Management Oﬃce, which supervises the state
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transferred with special approval by the government, giving up stock subscription rights and using receipts
from rights oﬀerings to pay cash dividends are similar to the transfer of non-tradable shares from majority
shareholders to minority shareholders, with a computed sale price higher than that of oﬃcially approved pri-
vate placements (Lee and Xiao, 2004). Thus, state shareholders would be more likely to use cash dividends as a
vehicle of tunneling in ﬁrms with higher state ownership. As the privatization of state-owned enterprises simul-
taneously involves a reduction in state-ownership and an increase in individual (public) ownership, we also
expect an opposite eﬀect of individual ownership on dividend policy to that of state ownership. In other
words, ﬁrms with more individual (public) ownership are less likely to pay cash dividends and more likely
to pay stock dividends.
We retest the hypotheses on the relationship between state and individual ownership and dividend policy as
the literature has documented an obvious trend that more and more ﬁrms are paying cash dividends instead of
stock dividends (Wei et al., 2004). In light of the change in the trend regarding stock dividends versus cash
dividends, we examine whether the ﬁndings of early studies, such as Wei et al. (2004) and Lee and Xiao
(2004) on state and/or individual ownership and dividends, still apply to more recent years or not. Thus,
we test the following hypotheses.Hypothesis on state ownership and dividends:
Hypothesis 3. Firms with more state ownership are more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay
stock dividends.
Hypothesis on individual (public) ownership and dividends:
Hypothesis 4. Firms with more individual ownership are less likely to pay cash dividends and more likely to
pay stock dividends.4. Research design
4.1. Sample selection
In this paper, we examine the dividend policies of publicly traded ﬁrms in China during the period 2001–
2006. Sample selection started with the entire population of ﬁrms issuing A-shares and/or B-shares that are
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, as well as ﬁrms issuing H-shares on
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and those ﬁrms that are cross-listed in the US and/or other foreign mar-
kets. The sample companies are selected on the basis of the following screening criteria: (1) Firms have been
listed on the exchanges for at least a year before dividend announcements to exclude the eﬀects of new list-
ings, (2) Financial and insurance ﬁrms are excluded due to their diﬀerent operations from other ﬁrms, (3)
Firms that experience reorganizations during the sample period are excluded as the ownership and
corporate governance of these ﬁrms could experience great changes, and so could their performance. The
screening procedures result in 7519 ﬁrm-year observations from 1712 companies, of which 908 companies
are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 804 on Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Among these 1712 com-
panies, 33 ﬁrms are cross-listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, 27 in the United States, 5 in London
and 1 in Singapore.
4.2. Models of dividend policy
As mentioned earlier, the literature has documented three schools of dividend policy theories to explain the
determinants of corporate dividend behavior – (1) full information models, (2) models of information asym-
metry and (3) behavioral models. Although these models have conﬂicting predictions on the eﬀect of dividend
policy on share returns, they provide a theoretical background for the determinants of dividend policies.
Hence, a theoretical function of the determinants of corporate dividend policy is:Dividends ¼ f ðtax factor; information asymmetry; agency costs; socioeconomic factors; cash flowÞ
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cash dividend income is exempt from tax if the cash dividend income is less than the one-year saving deposit
rate declared by China’s central bank. If the cash dividend income is higher than the above-mentioned
amount, a ﬂat tax rate of 20% is charged on the excess amount. For stock dividends, since the gains on the
stock dividends are not realized, there is no tax eﬀect. Dividend yields of Chinese ﬁrms are generally lower
than the declared saving rates which are around two to ten percent during the past decade (Cheng et al.,
2009). As our study uses data from a single country and a period with no signiﬁcant changes in tax policies,
we exclude the tax factor from our model. The literature shows that ﬁrm’s ownership structure, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm
debt, speciﬁc risk (beta) and investment opportunities (ﬁrm growth) could aﬀect information asymmetry risk
and agency costs (e.g., Choi et al., 2009). Industry features, time trend and previous dividend payout record
could form the socioeconomic factors of dividend policy (Faccio et al., 2001; Wei et al., 2004). For instance, a
ﬁrms’ past dividend policy determines its current clientele of investors and clientele eﬀects impede changing
policy, which is consistent with the socio-economic view of dividend policy (Shiller, 1984). Performance
and the level of cash in the ﬁrm could aﬀect cash ﬂow and in turn dividend policy. Accordingly, we examine
the following dividend policy model:CDPRiðSDPRiÞ ¼ a0 þ a1CROSSLISTiþ a2FOREIGNi þ a3STATEi þ a4PUBLICi þ a5SIZEi
þ a6DEBTi þ a7BETAi þ a8GROWi þ a9CASHi þ a10ROAi
þ a11LAGCDPRiðLAGSDPRiÞ þ a12þjRINDUSTRYj þ a13þjþkRYEARk þ ei ð1Þwhere CDPR = cash dividend payout ratio, calculated as cash dividends per share divided by earnings per
share; SDPR = stock dividend payout ratio, calculated as stock dividends per share divided by earnings per
share; CROSSLIST = 1 if the ﬁrm is cross-listed in Hong Kong, U.S., U.K. or Singapore, and 0 otherwise.
FOREIGN = the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign shareholders at the ﬁscal year end; STA-
TE = the percentage of equity shares owned by the government and its fully owned enterprises at the ﬁscal
year end; PUBLIC = the percentage of equity shares owned by public (individual) shareholders; SIZE = the
logarithm of book value of total assets at the ﬁscal year end; DEBT = the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets at the ﬁscal year end; BETA = a ﬁrm’s speciﬁc risk, estimated from a regression of share returns
on market returns during the ﬁscal year; GROW = a ﬁrm’s market to book (M/B) ratio at ﬁscal year
end as the proxy for growth and investment opportunities; CASH = the logarithm of the total cash balance
at the ﬁscal year end; ROA = a ﬁrm’s return on assets for the ﬁscal year; LAGCDPR = cash dividend pay-
out ratio in the previous ﬁscal year; LAGSDPR = stock dividend payout ratio in the previous ﬁscal
year;INDUSTRY = indicator variables for industries; YEAR = indicator variables controlling for year ef-
fects; e = the error term.
The regression analysis is conducted as follows. First, we conduct a series of OLS and Tobit regressions
using panel data. Furthermore, to mitigate the eﬀects of outliers, we winsorize variables involving ratio cal-
culations to their 1st and 99th percentile values. We also report the results of sensitivity analysis.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Univariate tests
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in Model (1). Columns two through six report the
statistics for the overall sample. The following two columns show information on ﬁrms paying zero and
non-zero cash dividends, respectively. The last two columns provide information on ﬁrms paying zero
and non-zero stock dividends, respectively. Details of statistical signiﬁcance are also provided. The results
show that on average ﬁrms with positive cash dividends have higher state ownership, lower individual (pub-
lic) ownership, lower market to book ratios (GROW), higher cash balances, larger asset bases (SIZE),
higher debt, higher ROA, higher possibility of being cross-listed and higher lagged cash dividends than
ﬁrms paying no cash dividends. On the other hand, ﬁrms distributing stock dividends on average have
lower foreign ownership, lower state ownership, and higher public ownership. They are also larger, have
higher debt, lower risk (BETA), higher market to book ratios (GROW), higher cash balances, higher
Table 3
Descriptive statistics. CDPR = Cash dividends payout ratio, calculated as cash dividend per share paid in a year divided by earnings per
share; SDPR = Stock dividend rate, calculated as stock dividend per share distributed in a year divided by earnings per share;
FOREIGN = the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign shareholders; CROSSLIST = 1 for ﬁrms cross-listed in stock exchanges
outside mainland China and 0 otherwise. STATE = the percentage of equity shares owned by the government; PUBLIC = percentage of
shares owned by the general public; SIZE = log10(total assets), DEBT = total liabilities to total assets ratio; BETA = estimate of beta of
the ﬁrm; GROW = market to book ratio; CASH = log10(Cash balance); ROA = return on assets. LAGCDPR and LAGSDPR are lagged
(one year) measures of cash and stock dividends, respectively. T-tests values are computed assuming unequal variances. ,  and 
represent signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively.
Variables Overall Cash dividend Stock dividend
=0 >0 =0 >0
N = 7519 N = 3523 N = 3996 N = 6391 N = 1128
Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. Mean Mean Mean Mean
CDPR 0.28 0.13 0.37 0.00 2.44 0.00 0.52 0.27 0.29
SDPR 0.45 0.00 1.63 0.00 11.40 0.47 0.44 0.00 3.01
FOREIGN 4.08 0.00 11.01 0.00 92.52 4.09 4.08 4.31 2.91
CROSSLIST 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01
STATE 36.09 39.89 25.13 0.00 88.58 31.83 39.86 36.74 32.71
PUBLIC 38.71 37.66 14.08 2.39 100.00 40.37 37.23 38.05 42.18
SIZE 6.19 6.15 0.44 2.35 8.77 6.05 6.30 6.17 6.28
DEBT 0.37 0.40 0.08 0.01 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.37
BETA 0.81 0.98 0.54 2.84 11.54 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.78
GROW 3.08 2.38 2.81 3.76 18.51 3.39 2.81 3.05 3.25
CASH 5.24 5.31 0.62 0.90 7.36 4.97 5.48 5.21 5.40
ROA 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05
LAGCDPR 0.21 0.00 0.46 0.00 2.44 0.12 0.29 0.21 0.22
LAGSDPR 0.38 0.00 1.50 0.00 11.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.48
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expectations, ﬁrms issuing cash dividends are more likely to be cross-listed and ﬁrms issuing stock divi-
dends are less likely to be cross-listed. As univariate analysis examines the eﬀect of each variable in isola-
tion, the results should be interpreted with caution and further examined under multivariate analysis, which
is presented later.6
Table 4 reports the correlations between the variables. Based on Pearson correlations, cash dividend payout
ratios (CDPR) are positively correlated with STATE (0.17), SIZE (0.16), CASH (0.26), ROA (0.29) and LAG-
CDPR (0.21), and negatively correlated with PUBLIC (0.10) and GROW (0.11). Hence the univariate sta-
tistics are consistent with the notion that ﬁrms with higher state ownership, lower public ownership, higher
accounting returns, higher cash balances, higher prior year cash dividends and lower growth opportunities
tend to have higher cash dividend payout rates. On the other hand, the Pearson correlations show that stock
dividend payout rates (SDPR) are positively related to PUBLIC (0.09), CASH (0.04), ROA (0.04) and
LAGSDPR (0.03), and negatively related to FOREIGN (0.05), CROSSLIST (0.04) and STATE
(0.05). Hence, ﬁrms with higher public ownership, more cash, higher proﬁtability and higher prior year stock
dividends tend to have higher stock dividends, while ﬁrms with higher STATE ownership tends to have lower
stock dividends. Again, these results should be interpreted with caution because the analysis is conducted on
each variable in isolation.
Explanatory variables with high correlations include those between ownership variables, such as PUB-
LIC and FOREIGN (with a Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of 0.45 and a Spearman coeﬃcient of
0.40), FOREIGN and CROSSLIST (both Pearson and Spearman coeﬃcients are 0.40), and PUBLIC
and STATE (with a Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of 0.33 and a Spearman coeﬃcient of 0.35). Other
high correlations between control variables are SIZE and CASH (both Pearson and Spearman coeﬃcients6 The values reported in the cash dividend and stock dividend columns in Table 3 also include ﬁrms paying both cash and stock
dividends. Such “joint paying” ﬁrms (795 ﬁrm-year observations) are less likely to be cross-listed, have lower foreign ownership, but are
larger, have bigger cash balances and higher ROA. Other diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant.
Table 4
Correlation analysis. CDPR = Cash dividends payout ratio, calculated as cash dividend per share paid in a year divided by earnings per share; SDPR = Stock dividend rate, calculated
as stock dividend per share distributed in a year divided by earnings per share; FOREIGN = the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign shareholders; CROSSLIST = 1 for ﬁrms
cross-listed in stock exchanges outside mainland China and 0 otherwise; STATE = the percentage of equity shares owned by the government; PUBLIC = percentage of shares owned
by the general public; SIZE = log10(total assets), DEBT = total liabilities to total assets ratio; BETA = estimate of beta of the ﬁrm; GROW= market to book ratio;
CASH = log10(Cash balance); ROA = return on assets. LAGCDPR and LAGSDPR are lagged (one year) measures of cash and stock dividends, respectively. T-tests values are
computed assuming unequal variances. ,  and  represent signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. The upper diagonal ﬁgures are Spearman correlations and the lower
diagonal values are Pearson correlations.
CDPR SDPR FOREIGN CROSS-LIST STATE PUBLIC SIZE DEBT BETA GROW CASH ROA LAGCDPR LAGSDPR
CDPR 1.00 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.14  0.23 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.35 0.51 0.35 0.07
SDPR 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.13
FOREIGN 0.01 0.05 1.00 0.40 0.08 0.40 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.03
CROSSLIST 0.01 0.04 0.40 1.00 0.07 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.05 0.04
STATE 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.08 1.00 0.35 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.02
PUBLIC 0.10 0.09 0.45 0.28 0.33 1.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.07
SIZE 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.09 1.00 0.35 0.03 0.33 0.74 0.18 0.26 0.09
DEBT 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.30 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.03
BETA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03
GROW 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04  0.11 0.27 0.09 0.01 1.00 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.02
CASH 0.26 0.04 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.08 0.74 0.10 0.04 0.19 1.00 0.34 0.25 0.09
ROA 0.29 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.46 1.00 0.27 0.13
LAGCDPR 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.13 1.00 0.17















































Regression analysis: determinants of cash and stock dividends the regression is based on 7519
observations over 2001–2006 and includes all listed ﬁrms in China. The dependent variables are cash
dividend payout ratio, calculated as cash dividend per share paid in a year divided by earnings per share,
and stock dividend, calculated as stock dividend per share distributed in a year divided by earnings per
share. STATE is the percentage of equity shares owned by the government. FOREIGN is the percentage
of equity shares owned by foreign shareholders; CROSSLIST = 1 for ﬁrms cross-listed in stock
exchanges outside mainland China and 0 otherwise; PUBLIC is the percentage of equity shares owned
by public shareholders; SIZE = log10(total assets), DEBT = total liabilities to total assets ratio;
BETA = estimate of beta of the ﬁrm; GROW= market to book ratio; CASH = log10(Cash balance);
ROA = return on assets. LAGCDPR and LAGSDPR are lagged (one year) measures of cash and stock
dividends, respectively. In each regression we also put in INDUSTRY, indicator variables for industries
and YEAR, indicator variables controlling for year eﬀects. For simplicity of presentation the last two
items are not shown here. , ,  represent signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. Robust
standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics.














Adj R-sq 0.2076 0.0218
F-value 88.21 12.54
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0.35), and CASH and ROA (with a Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of 0.46 and a Spearman coeﬃcient of
0.34). Nonetheless, analysis based on variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) indicate that none of the
explanatory variables have VIF values larger than 10, alleviating the concern of severe multicollinearity
problems.5.2. OLS and TOBIT regressions
We present the results of OLS regressions for both cash and stock dividends, respectively in Table 5.
Consistent with our hypotheses, cash dividend payment varies positively with STATE ownership and neg-
atively with FOREIGN ownership, PUBLIC ownership and CROSSLIST. These results are consistent with
the notion that ﬁrms with higher state ownership distribute more cash dividends and that they might even
do so to tunnel cash to major shareholders (state) in situations when cash dividend payments might not be
the best strategy for the ﬁrm. Interestingly, both foreign ownership and cross-listings have signiﬁcant neg-
ative eﬀects on cash dividends, consistent with the expected moderating eﬀect on tunneling activity. As
expected, the results on PUBLIC (individual) ownership are the opposite of those for STATE ownership.
For control variables, ﬁrms with higher cash balances and higher return on assets are more likely to pay
higher cash dividends in order to signal their value. All of these results are consistent with the signaling
theory of dividend payments. Also, ﬁrms with lower growth rates (more mature ﬁrms) are more likely
to pay cash dividends, consistent with the notion that mature ﬁrms pay more dividends. In addition, cash
dividend levels are positively and signiﬁcantly related to lagged cash dividends in the previous ﬁscal year,
Table 6
Tobit analysis: determinants of cash and stock dividends. The regression is based on 7519
observations over 2001–2006 and includes all listed ﬁrms in China. The dependent variables
are cash dividend payout ratio, calculated as cash dividend per share paid in a year divided
by earnings per share, and stock dividend, calculated as stock dividend per share distributed
in a year divided by earnings per share. STATE is the percentage of equity shares owned by
the government. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign
shareholders; CROSSLIST = 1 for ﬁrms cross-listed in stock exchanges outside mainland
China and 0 otherwise; PUBLIC is the percentage of equity shares owned by public
shareholders; SIZE = log10(total assets), DEBT = total liabilities to total assets ratio;
BETA = estimate of beta of the ﬁrm; GROW = market to book ratio; CASH = log10(Cash
balance); ROA = return on assets. LAGCDPR and LAGSDPR are lagged (one year)
measures of cash and stock dividends, respectively. In each regression we also put in
INDUSTRY, indicator variables for industries and YEAR, indicator variables controlling
for year eﬀects. For simplicity of presentation the last two items are not shown here. , , 
represent signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.














Pseudo R-sq 0.1847 0.0145
Log-likelihood 4754.44 5336.53
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dividends.
The results of OLS regressions on stock dividends imply that the determinants of stock dividends are
diﬀerent from those of cash dividends. First, consistent with our hypotheses and in contrast to the ﬁndings
on cash dividends, stock dividends are negatively associated with STATE ownership and positively associ-
ated with PUBLIC ownership. Note that the coeﬃcient on PUBLIC is now signiﬁcantly positive, indicating
that ﬁrms with higher individual ownership (free ﬂoat) are more likely to pay more stock dividends, which is
consistent with the literature (Wei et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2006). Because the coeﬃcient on PUBLIC in the
cash dividends model is signiﬁcantly negative, it suggests that stock and cash dividends are probably perfect
substitutes from the perspective of individual shareholders. Unlike cash dividends, stock dividends have no
wealth redistribution eﬀect. Hence, it is also natural that ﬁrms with higher state ownership distribute less
stock dividends. CROSSLIST is signiﬁcantly negative here, which is not consistent with our hypothesis
on the eﬀect of cross-listing on stock dividends. For control variables, ﬁrms with higher growth opportuni-
ties (GROW), more cash (CASH), higher proﬁtability (ROA) and lower risk (BETA) are more likely to pay
stock dividends. Firms with these attributes are more growth-oriented, hence these ﬁrms are trying to pre-
serve their cash to take advantage of growth opportunities. In addition, stock dividend levels are positively
and signiﬁcantly related to those of the previous ﬁscal year, which again provides evidence of the clientele
eﬀect on dividends.
The results are robust even when Tobit analysis is used instead of OLS regressions. Table 6 reports the
results using TOBIT analysis. For cash dividends, except for a diﬀerence in the signiﬁcance of the SIZE
Table 7
Regression analysis: determinants of cash and stock dividends to earnings per share
ratio the regression is based on 7519 observations over 2001–2006 and includes all
listed ﬁrms in China. The dependent variables are cash dividend payout ratio,
calculated as cash dividend per share paid in a year divided by earnings per share, and
stock dividend, calculated as stock dividend per share distributed in a year divided by
earnings per share. STATE is the percentage of equity shares owned by the
government. FOREIGN is the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign
shareholders; CROSSLIST = 1 for ﬁrms cross-listed in stock exchanges outside
mainland China and 0 otherwise; PUBLIC is the percentage of equity shares owned
by public shareholders; SIZE = log10(total assets), DEBT = total liabilities to total
assets ratio; BETA = estimate of beta of the ﬁrm; GROW= market to book ratio;
CASH = log10(Cash balance); ROA = return on assets. LAGCDPR and LAGSDPR
are lagged (one year) measures of cash and stock dividends, respectively. In each
regression we also put in INDUSTRY, indicator variables for industries and YEAR,
indicator variables controlling for year eﬀects. For simplicity of presentation the last
two items are not shown here. , ,  represent signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10,
respectively. Robust standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics.

















Adj R-sq 0.2093 0.0224
F-value 82.26 12.08
K.C.K. Lam et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 199–216 213variable, which is now signiﬁcant, the qualitative results are the same as in Table 5. The results for stock div-
idends are also consistent with those in Table 5.77 We also would like to report some results which for conciseness are not provided in the tables. First, in Tables 5 and 6, we put both
FOREIGN and CROSSLIST in the regressions. One potential criticism is that these are overlapping measures. However, in the Chinese
setting, this is not true. The correlation between the variables in our sample is 0.40 which is not exceedingly large. FOREIGN captures
ownership by foreign investors in the listed ﬁrms through strategic ownership or direct investment on both domestic and foreign markets,
while CROSSLIST measures share percentage traded on foreign exchanges. Nonetheless, if we use only FOREIGN or CROSSLIST (but
not both) in the regression, they are still be negative and signiﬁcant in the regression for cash dividends, insigniﬁcant for FOREIGN but
marginally signiﬁcant for CROSSLIST in stock dividends. Second, we explore the eﬀects of controlling for stock dividends (lagged and
non-lagged) in the cash dividend model and cash dividends (lagged and non-lagged) in the stock dividend model. We do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant results for these additional controls, suggesting that cross eﬀects among cash and stock dividends do not exist. Third, we explore
the possibility of using both stock and cash dividends versus stock dividends as a signal of future prospects. We use a logit regression for
our analysis as it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a basis to sum up both dividends. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms paying both cash and stock dividends, when
compared with ﬁrms paying stock dividends only, tend to be larger, with higher ROA, higher market to book ratios and more cash.
Nonetheless, they also have much lower state ownership or cross-listing, which are the typical features of cash dividend paying ﬁrms.
Hence ﬁrms paying cash and stock dividends have the hybrid characteristics of ﬁrms paying cash dividends alone and ﬁrms paying stock
dividends only. However, since one of our research focuses is to contrast the two types of dividends, our analysis concerning ﬁrms paying
both types of dividends is supplementary at best.
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In this section, we perform several sensitivity tests to verify the robustness of our results. First, as alterna-
tive measures of dividend payout ratios, we use dividends per share (DPS) and dividends per share divided by
net sales per share. The results are qualitatively the same as those reported.
Second, to test the robustness of our results using ROA as a proxy for proﬁtability, we use return on equity
(ROE). Again, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported above.
Third, we test whether other shareholders mediate the eﬀect of state ownership on dividend policies. Table 7
reports these results. With the interaction terms between state ownership and other ownership variables added
in the cash dividend regression, FOREIGN is not signiﬁcant but CROSSLIST is signiﬁcantly negative. How-
ever, the interaction eﬀect STATEFOREIGN is negative and signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level, consistent with the
notion that foreign ownership (FOREIGN) in eﬀect suppresses cash tunneling by state owners (STATE). The
results are diﬀerent for stock dividends. Here the interaction term STATEFOREIGN is not signiﬁcant, which
is expected as stock dividends have no cash eﬀect. Our results are also consistent with a recent line of literature
that argues that foreign ownership is useful in restraining controlling shareholders in their exploitation of
domestic minority shareholders (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).
Finally, a common concern in using a panel dataset like ours is inference problems due to the correlation of
the residuals across ﬁrms and across years, which may result in estimation bias (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). To
alleviate this concern, we re-perform our OLS analysis using the Fama-MacBeth approach. Our results (not
presented here) indicate that such a bias is not likely to aﬀect our conclusions.8
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate whether ﬁrms with diﬀerent ownership characteristics have diﬀerent dividend
policies. As indicated in the dividend literature, dividends play a signaling role. Also, dividends could be used
by state-owned agents who are majority shareholders to tunnel money from state-controlled ﬁrms to
themselves (tunneling eﬀect). Such a situation could especially be dominant in emerging markets.8 We summarize here other sensitivity tests we have performed. First, we perform tests to study the eﬀect of rights issues on both types of
dividends. We ﬁnd that the rights issue variable is signiﬁcantly positive for both stock and cash dividends, signifying the importance of
future ﬁnancing in dividend decisions in China. Second, we examine the eﬀect of ownership concentration. Our measure of concentration
is HOLD, which is deﬁned as the percentage of shares owned by the top 10 shareholders. We ﬁnd that HOLD is signiﬁcantly positively
related to cash dividends, signifying that cash dividends are more prevalent among concentrated ﬁrms, which is consistent with the
tunneling story. In contrast, HOLD is signiﬁcantly negatively related to stock dividends, consistent with the notion that stock dividends
are prevalent for low concentration ﬁrms. Third, we examine tunneling activities through intercorporate loans in China. Using other
receivables to total assets (ORECTA) ratio, we ﬁnd that the variable is signiﬁcantly negative in the cash dividend regression. We interpret
this result as suggesting that cash dividends and intercorporate loans are substitutes for tunneling. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
ORECTA on stock dividends. Fourth, we decompose foreign shareholders into foreign individual and foreign institutional shareholders.
We ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of foreign ownership on cash dividends is driven by foreign individual shares and not by foreign
institutional shares. When we exclude the foreign institutional shares from the deﬁnition of total foreign ownership, the negative eﬀect of
foreign ownership on cash dividends is even more signiﬁcant. Fifth, we perform a test on the potential inﬂuence of the split share structure
reform (2005–2007). As mentioned in Note 2, state shares were typically non-tradable during the period of our study, as they could only be
bought and sold through private placement with special approval from the government. However, in 2005, the Chinese government
launched a reform on split share structure by converting non-tradable shares (state and legal person shares) into tradable shares. We
perform the regressions separately for the two sub-periods - one with the data on or before 2004 and another after 2004. We ﬁnd that the
signiﬁcance of the variables in the regressions does not vary much from the tabled results. Finally, an alternative explanation of our results
could be that ﬁrms in diﬀerent stages of their life cycle have diﬀerent preferred dividend choices. Firms with high maturity (larger in size
and with lower growth rates) are more likely to distribute cash dividends, while ﬁrms with lower maturity (smaller and higher growth) are
more likely to distribute stock dividends. To shed light on this issue, we group our observations into four diﬀerent partitions: HA-HG,
HA-LG, LA-HG and LA-LG, where HA is for ﬁrms with above mean SIZE, LA is for ﬁrms with SIZE at or below the mean value, HG is
for ﬁrms with above mean GROW and LG is for ﬁrms with GROW at or below the mean value. Based on these partitions, our variables of
interest, FOREIGN and CROSSLIST have the expected signs in all four regression segments. CROSSLIST is signiﬁcant for the large ﬁrm
segments. This is reasonable as larger ﬁrms are more likely to be cross-listed than smaller ﬁrms and thus they have more variation in these
segments. FOREIGN, however, is highly signiﬁcant in small ﬁrms with high growth rates. This is expected as smaller ﬁrms are less likely to
be cross-listed and the diﬀerentiating factor is more likely to be FOREIGN. The results are robust when we use median rather than mean
values to diﬀerentiate between high and low observations.
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dividend policy and practice. We ﬁnd that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have signiﬁcant negative
eﬀects on cash dividends, consistent with the notion of reduced tunneling activities for ﬁrms with the ability to
raise capital outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling hypothesis, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher state
ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends. In addition, ﬁrms with higher indi-
vidual (public) ownership pay lower cash dividends and higher stock dividends.
These results have signiﬁcant implications for researchers, investors, policy-makers and regulators. Our
results indicate that foreign shareholders prefer low cash dividends, suggesting that foreign investors help
reduce tunneling activities in ﬁrms in emerging markets. Our results further suggest the beneﬁts of fostering
foreign investors’ activities in public companies in emerging markets.
In addition, in contrast to prior literature, our results document an inverse trend with fewer ﬁrms paying
cash dividends over the period 2001–2006 than the previous period, which helps to shed light on a time-series
shift in dividend policies. These results suggest a dynamic approach is needed for researchers to investigate
dividend payment policies.
Also, the results on the role of majority shareholders, such as state shareholders in the unique setting of
China, can help us obtain a better understanding of the role of government ownership in the business world,
as more governments in western countries have obtained and/or increased state ownership in business enter-
prises during the recent economic crisis.
Finally, our results help investors obtain a comprehensive understanding of the diﬀerent roles of various
shareholders in shaping corporate dividend policies. Further, our results show that growth opportunities, cash
ﬂow and proﬁtability have similar eﬀects on dividends in the emerging market of China as documented by
prior literature (Alpa, 2005; Goergen et al., 2005), which helps investors determine their investment strategies.
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